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# Information Security for the future smart grid

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Lecture Chalmers 2015-05-07




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## Agenda

- > What is Svenska Kraftnät (SvK, Swedish national grid)
- > International/national perspectives
- > R&D at SvK
- > Cyber security
- > Challenges
- > Discussion (10-15 min)




## The National Grid



## The National Grid

- > Transmission lines: 15 000 km
  - > 220 - 400 kV
  - > HVDC
- > No. of switching stations: 135
- > National Control Centre: Sundbyberg



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## Before de-regulation 1996




- > National, regional and local levels
- > Statens Vattenfallsverk operated on all levels
- > Cooperation (not competition) between companies, to optimally operate
  
- > SCADA/EMS-systems: Proprietary, not open.



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
## After de-regulation 1996

- > Statens Vattenfallsverk was split:  
Affärsverket Svenska Kraftnät (Swedish National Grid)+  
Vattenfall AB
- > Both SvK and VAB started to separate their structures for  
Operation/Control
  - > SvK: KRASS (KRAftSystemStyrning)
  - > VAB: DRISS (DRiftStödSystem)




## National – Regional and local networks

- > National grid
  - > 400 and 220 kV
  - > Svenska Kraftnät
- > Regional networks
  - > 40 – 130 kV
  - > ~ 40 networks
  - > 10 companies
- > Local networks
  - > < 40 kV
  - > ~ 310 networks
  - > ~200 companies



## System Operator Responsibility

- > **Power system in balance: 50 Hz**
  - > Handles the national momentary balance
  - > Manages bottlenecks
  - > Distributes costs



## Svenska Kraftnät

- Power line highways + connections to neighboring countries
- System responsible authority


### Also: Nordic perspectives

- Nordic countries have lot of common interests
- Co-funding of projects



### Large Projects (put into operation)



- 01 Stockholms Ström (2010-2020)
- 02 Sydlänken (2014)
- 03 NordBalt (2015/2016)
- 04 FennoSkan 2 (2011)
- 05 Gotlandsförbindelsen (2017)



# Wind Power in Sweden

- > **Goal**  
30 TWh / 12 000 MW
- > **Identified projects**  
45 000 MW
- > **Current capacity**

Hydro	16 000
Nuclear	<u>9 000</u>
	25 000 MW



## European Collaboration – ENTSO-E

- 41 TSOs from 34 countries
- Founded on 19 Dec 2008 and fully operational since July 2009
- A trans-European network
  - 532 million citizens served
  - 880 GW generation
  - 305,000 Km of transmission lines
  - 3,200 TWh/year demand
  - 380 TWh/year exchanges



## European Network for Transmission System operators – Electricity: ENTSO-E

- > ENTSO-E committees ([www.entsoe.eu](http://www.entsoe.eu)):
  - > System Operation Committee (SOC)
  - > Market Committee (MC)
  - > System Development Committee (SDC)
  - > R&D Committee (RDC)
    - > R&D Plan



## Broad scope

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- > Energy. Power supply
- > Critical for the society
- > Environment
- > Technical issues
- > Market issues
- > Swedish, Nordic, International
  
- > *Cyber security: Devil is in the details. Small issues are big and strategically important!*



## Why is cyber security important for electric utilities?

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- > Important – society critical – infrastructure for society
  - > Power, telecom, water, gas, transport, ...
- > More and more dependent on functioning IT-systems
- > If IT-systems do not work:
  - > No-one knows why...
  - > Delays : SJ did not know why a signal error occurred. Sabotage?



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## Dam – Three Gorges China



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## R&D Svenska Kraftnät

- > R&D Plan 2015-2017. Updated yearly.
  - > System aspects, Operation, robustness, Security, Environment, IT and telecommunications, Network technology, Maintenance of the grid, Energy market, Maintenance knowledge and education. Dam safety.
  - > E.g. Wind power connection research, Support to PhD & MSc projects
- > 3 MEuro / year
  - > R&D companies, universities, consultants,
- > Also: 0,5 Meuro / year – electricity preparedness
  - > Dam safety. SCADA Security.




## Stockholm Royal Seaport – A world class sustainable city, with a Smart Grid as the enabler

### Objectives

- > 2030: fossil free
- > 10 000 apartments  
30 000 office places
- > 30 % in-house renewables
- > Demand Side Participation



### Smart Grid components: Integrated Active House and Electric Vehicle



### Benefits

- > Active 'prosumer' benefits from most favorable spot price
- > Peak load shaving by local production, storage and time shift of consumption
- > Overall reduction of energy consumption by increased consumer awareness

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## Cyber Security

> Digital security (not yet mature)

Versus

> Physical security (well established)



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## Information Security acc. to Wikipedia

> **Information security** (sometimes shortened to InfoSec) is the practice of *defending information* from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, perusal, inspection, recording or destruction. It is a general term that can be used regardless of the form the data may take (electronic, physical, etc)



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## IT Security acc. to Wikipedia

- > Sometimes referred to as [computer security](#),
- > (most often some form of computer system). It is worthwhile to note that a [computer](#) does not necessarily mean a home desktop. A [computer](#) is any device with a [processor](#) and some memory (even a calculator). IT security specialists are almost always found in any major enterprise/establishment due to the nature and value of the data within larger businesses. They are responsible for keeping all of the [technology](#) within the company secure from malicious cyber attacks that often attempt to breach into critical private information or gain control of the internal systems



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## Comparison

- > Information security: Routines, policies, knowledge – "softer"
- > IT-security: technically – firewalls, log-in keys– "harder"
  
- > But: Small technical details may have strategic importance:
  - > Lost USB-sticks, computers which are not locked, ...



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## Smart Grids

### Definitions

- > **"The application of digital technology to the electric power infrastructure"**
- > ....and many others



## Seven key EU technology challenges for the next 10 years to meet the 2020 targets, the SET-plan:


1. Make second generation **biofuels** competitive alternatives to fossil fuels, while respecting the sustainability of their production;
2. Enable commercial use of technologies for **CO2 capture**, transport and storage through demonstration at industrial scale, including whole system efficiency and advanced research;
3. Double the power generation capacity of the largest **wind** turbines, with offshore wind as the lead application;
4. Demonstrate commercial readiness of large-scale **Photovoltaic (PV)** and Concentrated Solar Power;
5. Enable a single, **smart European electricity grid** able to accommodate the massive integration of renewable and decentralised energy sources;
6. Bring to mass market more **efficient energy** conversion and end-use devices and systems, in buildings, transport and industry, such as poly-generation and fuel cells;
7. Maintain competitiveness in **fission technologies**, together with long-term waste management solutions;



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## Data communication

> "Enabler" for operation/control



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## Increase in communication capability

From

> Narrowband walking paths




To


> Broadband 7-lane highways




## Development of Industrial Control Systems 1(2)



1. Islands of operation




2. Interconnected




3. Partially Integrated

## Development of Industrial Control Systems 2(2)



4. Today. Full integration system structure

5. De-coupling between Operational SCADA/EMS and Admin IT environments




# SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition

## Industrial Processes

- > Power Network
- > Power Production
- > Telecommunication network
- > Water
- > Transport
- > ...



# Access points to SCADA-system Threat and possibilities



## SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition

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- > Increasingly accessible via Internet
- > Same technical solution as common office IT systems
- > Process control system integrated with office systemsIntegrering med administrativa IT-system
- > **Same vulnerabilities for SCADA systems as for office IT! What to do?**
- > Disturbances can have severe impact on critical infrastructutes
  - > Power, water, gas, transport
  - > "CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection"
  - > "CIIP = Critical **Information** Infrastructure Protection"



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## Challenges



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## Interesting Topics for the Smart Grid

- > **SCADA system security**, incl. evolution and legacy systems and environments
- > **AMI (Automatic Meter Infrastructure) security**, incl. larger attack surface and switch between back-end (meters, earlier) to front-end (e-meters, now+future)
- > Risks implied vs benefits to expect from “smartness” and balance between the two
- > Risks implied by remote, network-communicated operations (+ to use Internet or not to use it)
- > Privacy issues
- > Can regulations imply increased security?
- > What is expected from utilities vs other actors



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## Smart meters

- > Technical possibilities. Broadband => faster, bulky
- > From the households:
  - > collect kWh-data, basis for billing
- > To the households
  - > Price information
  - > **Controls** – opens up new cyber security issues
- > ***“Which party will be responsible when, by mistake or by intentional digital tampering, a household is disconnected for two weeks, and that the owner of the house gets damages by destroyed food or water leakage, when he is away on two weeks of vacation?”***
  - > The owner? The utility? Who?
- > These issues are clearly related to cyber security and they must be raised within the electric power arena.



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## Delicate issues!

- > "AIC" rather than "CIA" in electric arena
  - > Confidentiality ("Sekretess")
  - > Integrity ("Riktighet")
  - > Availability ("Tillgänglighet")
- => Low priority for Confidentiality – Risk for Intrusion?
- > SCADA Security
- > (Still) Enormous need for education awareness!



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## Smart Grid System – A way towards the use of wind power


- > 20-30 TWh out of 150 TWh may be based on wind power within 10 years
- > Wind power not marginal for Svenska Kraftnät
- > Wind – intermittent. How maintain electrical balance?
  
- > What kind of IT-systems are needed?  
How to present just what is needed, and not "nice to have"?



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## Research issues

- > Develop models which can be tested in lab and reality
- > Methods to measure and design secure control systems  
E.g.: How secure is an Industrial Control Systems structure ?
- > System architectures which include security from the beginning.
- > Analysis of critical infrastructure ( SCADA system)
- > How incorporate security into an existing "legacy system"?
- > ...



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## Concluding remarks

- > Swedish → Nordic → European R&D issues
- > Climate goals => Introduction of renewables => change in power transmission
- > Smart Grid → Smart System
- > From islands-of-automation to fully integrated



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## Concluding remarks

- > Openness. Communication capabilities
- > Digital/Cyber security
  - > New issue for the utility
  - > Essential issue in a smart grid critical infrastructure
- > Proprietary → Standard and 3rd party software
- > Openness creates possibilities, which we want to have
- > Openness creates new problems to solve: digital security



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> SCADA security: important for society critical infrastructure

power, water, transport, ...

> Include security from the beginning

> R&D – an important success factor!

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## Recommendations

> Power utilities / customers – address security from the beginning!

> Vendors – be pro-active! Include security in solutions from the beginning!

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## Know incidents

- > Spilling water utility Australia 48 times. Radio controlled.
- > Stuxnet Siemens PLC 24 months
- > Log-in issues in banks

### *Reflection*

- > IT-incidents – nothing you talk about– embarrassing.



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Thanks for your attention!  
Questions?

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